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In a forthcoming article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives1, Harvard Professor
and bestselling textbook author Greg Mankiw defends the income earned by the
richest 1%, as opposed to the movement of the 99% that attacks the explosion of
inequality and the concentration of income and wealth. Mankiw cites the study by
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003, updated 2011)2, which shows that in the
United States the share of income earned by the richest 1% rose from 7.7% in 1973 to
17.4% in 2010. Mankiw argues that the income received by the 1% is fair and
denounces the idea of taxing them at what he considers confiscatory rates. He criticizes
in particular the proposal of French President François Hollande to tax high income at a
marginal rate of 75%, in the following terms: “using the force of government to seize
such a large share of the fruits of someone else’s labor is unjust, even if the taking is
sanctioned by a majority of the citizenry”. To defend this position, Mankiw uses a
theory of justice based on “just deserts”. According to this perspective, people should
receive compensation in proportion to their contributions. If the economy were
described by a classical competitive equilibrium without externalities or public goods,
then every individual would earn the value of his or her own marginal product, and
there would be no need for government to redistribute. In this perspective, equity is
perfectly aligned with the right incentives.
To illustrate his point, Mankiw uses the famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument deve-
loped by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia3, as summarized below: 
Imagine a society with perfect economic equality. Perhaps out of sheer coinci-
dence, the supply and demand for different types of labor produce an
equilibrium in which everyone earns the same income. There is no need for redis-
tribution and because people earn their marginal contribution, everyone is
perfectly incentivized. The society enjoys not only perfect equality but also
perfect efficiency. 
1. G. Mankiw, 2013, “Defending the one percent”, forthcoming Journal of Economic Perspective. http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/defending_the_one_percent_0.pdf
2. T. Piketty and E. Saez, 2003, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118(1), 2003, 1-39, Data updated in 2011 (xls).
3. R. Nozick, 1974, Anarchia, State and Utopia, Basic Books, New York. 
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idea for a new product. This might be Steve Jobs as he develops the iPod or JK
Rowling as she writes Harry Potter or Steven Spielberg as he directs his block-
buster movies [in 1974 , Nozick used the example of the basketball superstar,
Wilt Chamberlain]. Everyone in society wants to buy the new product for say
$100. Following voluntary exchanges, the resulting distribution of economic
well-being is now vastly unequal. 
Mankiw and Nozick both conclude that the new distribution is fair, but for different
reasons. Nozick used a procedural justice perspective: since the initial distribution is fair
and the exchanges are voluntary and to the mutual benefit of both parties, and there-
fore fair, then the final distribution is necessarily fair. Mankiw uses a distributive justice
perspective: the new distribution is fair because it respects the marginal contributions
of each individual. Under this approach, assessing the fairness of the income distribu-
tion involves checking whether the final state of the income distribution actually
satisfies the principle of marginal contribution. 
I focus here on a limit in Mankiw’s demonstration: the economy in which the 1%
live is not a classic competitive equilibrium in ways that the author does not discuss,
and therefore income does not reflect marginal contributions. One could also argue
that marginal productivity is not the only way to apply the contribution principle,
especially in the presence of a cooperative surplus4, or that other principles of distri-
butive justice (equality, needs) could compete with the principle of contribution,
which implies a compromise between these principles. We must say here that, in
Mankiw’s text, and by extension in this response, the term “one percent” should not
be taken too literally: the incomes discussed by Mankiw (of CEOs, traders and enter-
tainment superstars) concern rather the one per one thousand or even the one per
ten thousand5. 
Do the 1% really live in an economy with classical 
competitive equilibrium?
Mankiw's demonstration against redistribution is based on the idea that market
prices (wages, compensation of contractors) reflect the marginal productivity of indivi-
duals. He then explains the rising income share of the top 1% by skill-biased
technological change: “Aided by digital technologies, entrepreneurs, CEOs, entertain-
ment stars, and financial executives have been able to leverage their talents across
global markets and capture reward that would have been unimaginable in earlier
times” (McAfee, 2011, cited in the text). Mankiw nevertheless recognizes that the
4. There is a cooperative surplus when the division of labor improves total production. The competitive market
equilibrium divides the cooperative surplus proportionally to marginal productivities. For some, including
Mankiw, this principle is fair, but one can imagine other equitable ways to share the surplus, including equal
sharing, especially when it is difficult to distinguish individual marginal contributions. One can also note that an
individual’s marginal productivity depends on the state of society and therefore on the work of other members of
society (think of Bill Gates’ productivity in the United States or in a Papuan tribe). In this perspective, individuals
are not fully responsible for their marginal productivity and do not necessarily "deserve" it entirely.  
5. Moreover, the issue of capital income, donations and inheritances is not discussed in the text. To say the
least, it appears difficult to defend in a single text merit measured by marginal contribution and the repeal of the
Estate tax. See Mankiw, "The Estate Tax Is One Death Penalty Too Many," Fortune, 4 September 2000.
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externalities, public goods or rent-seeking. In the presence of externalities, the market
price does not reflect the social marginal contribution, but Mankiw argues that in this
case we need public policies that correct externalities through Pigovian taxes. This is
right, for example, in the case of a polluting activity. But Mankiw neglects the fact that
economic inequality itself can be a negative externality, directly if equality is included
in social welfare or indirectly if it reduces social mobility or social cohesion. 
Unlike Joseph Stiglitz in his book The Price of Inequality6, Mankiw does not believe
that the rising income share of the top 1 percent is largely attributable to successful
rent-seeking. Rent-seeking can be defined as the manipulation of the economic and
social policy environment – rather than the creation of new economic wealth – in order
to obtain a larger share of the economic wealth produced. Mankiw recognizes that
there are elements of rent-seeking in financial industries, and especially in certain
speculative activities such as high- frequency trading, but denies that the increase in
the income of the 1% is mainly due to this phenomenon7. Above all, he stresses that
the right response in terms of public policy is to reduce the phenomenon with better
regulations and institutions, rather than to address it through taxation. While we
cannot agree more with Mankiw on this point, it should be noted that the author
implicitly recognizes that income is not only the consequence of market equilibrium,
but also depends on the regulations and institutions in which the market is embedded.
To make his point, Mankiw uses only examples of perfectly competitive markets
where contributory equity and efficiency are perfectly aligned. But what happens if the
market intrinsically cannot be made competitive?
Financial markets, for example, are known to be imperfectly competitive markets. In
these markets, the prices do not necessarily reflect all available information. The classic
law of supply and demand does not work: an increase in the price of a financial asset
may result in an increase in its demand. In that case, it is illusory to think that the
market-based income of people operating in the financial markets may reflect
something approaching marginal social contribution, especially if informational rents
are important and give rise to “heist phenomena” as described by Olivier Godechot8.
Financiers do not operate in a classic competitive economy, which does not mean that
their social contribution is null, but rather that the market is unable to measure this
contribution. Moreover, as shown by Godechot in the case of France, the role of the
financial sector in the growth of inequality is particularly important, especially at the
top of the ladder9.
Jobs, Rowling and Spielberg do not work in the financial sector, but do they live in a
classical competitive economy? It is significant that two of the three examples of
Mankiw (as well as Nozick’s example, Chamberlain) are superstars of the entertain-
6. J. Stiglitz, 2012, The Price of Inequality, W.W. Norton, New York. 
7. Neither Stiglitz nor Mankiw provide compelling evidence in one sense or the other. On the question of rent-
seeking by the top 1% income earners, see Alvaredo et al. (2013) for a literature review and some empirical
evidence: F. Alvaredo, A. Atkinson, T. Piketty and E. Saez, 2013, “The top 1 percent in international and historical
perspective”, NBER Working Paper, no. 19075.   
8. O. Godechot, 2006, "‘Hold-up’ in finance: the conditions of possibility for high bonuses in the financial
industry”, Revue française de sociologie, vol. 49, Supplement Annual English Edition, pp. 95-123: http://
olivier.godechot.free.fr/hopfichiers/Hold-up_in_Finance_Rfs_2008.pdf 
9. Godechot Olivier, 2011, “Finance, an Inequality Factor”, Books and ideas.net. URL: http://
olivier.godechot.free.fr/hopfichiers/20110415_GodechotEN.pdfbriefing paper no. 4 / 19 july 2013 3
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work in what is perceived as a competitive industry: there is no shortage of people
wanting to be the next superstar. In this sense, the merit of superstars is difficult to
attack, because they are chosen by the public after a fierce competition. However, is
the remuneration of superstars congruent with their marginal social contribution, since
is the standard that Mankiw chooses for measuring equity? This is highly doubtful. In
fact, the entertainment economy is characterized by network effects: the value
provided by the consumption of the good depends not only on the intrinsic quality of
the good but also on the number of other people using it, i.e. when I choose to go to
the cinema to see the latest Spielberg movie, not only for the experience the movie
procures, but also (especially?) to share that experience with other people (opinion,
citation, pastiche, etc.). This explains the winner-take-all aspect of the entertainment
industry, especially when the marginal cost of production is low. In a landmark paper
on the economics of superstars, Sherwin Rosen (1981) shows that with network effects
and low marginal cost, very small differences in talent can lead to astronomical
earnings differences10. Moshe Adler (1985) points out that these large earnings diffe-
rences do not necessarily arise from differences in talent but also from luck among
individuals of equal talent11. This is true because a small initial advantage in terms of
exposure can result in large differences in income through a snowball effect: think, for
example, of the celebrities of popular culture who are famous for being ... famous. 
This superstar phenomenon does not apply just to the entertainment industry but
can also concern, for example, authors of economics textbooks, such as Mankiw
himself, as a 1995 New York Times article illustrates12. Mankiw is interviewed after the
signing of a major publishing contract for an introductory textbook: “The top three or
four textbooks, even the top 10, are profitable, wildly profitable”. The journalist adds:
“The market for introductory economics textbooks, which most publishers peg at $50
million a year, is a lot like the movie business. Thirty to 40 books are typically on the
market, but only a handful of blockbusters, selling more than 50,000 copies a year at
around $55 each, provide a feast of regular profits, leaving crumbs for everybody else.”
Is this due to major innovations by the bestselling authors? Not according to a study:
“Indeed, as a 1990 study by two economists, William Walstad and Michael Watts,
found, all the successful textbooks are remarkably similar in content.” Mankiw adds:
“these things are evolutionary, not revolutionary”. This is clearly an industry where a
lot of people want the same product not because it is new and innovative and
responds to new needs but because they want … to use the same product as others. In
that case, superstars do not operate in a pure competitive market. In the presence of
network effects, the conditions for competitive equilibrium are not met. The income of
the superstar is thus not equal to their marginal social contribution: he or she receives
in addition a winner’s bonus that would be captured by another superstar in their
absence. Since the earnings of superstars are greater than their marginal social contri-
bution, taxing them can be justified both in terms of equity and efficiency.   
10. S. Rosen, 1981, “The Economics of Superstars”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, no. 5. URL: http://
www.ppge.ufrgs.br/GIACOMO/arquivos/ecop72/rosen-1981.pdf 
11. M. Adler, 1995, “Stardom and Talent”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, no. 1. URL: http://
www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/Adler_1985_Stardom_and_Talent.pdf 
12. “A Hard Act to Follow? Here Goes”, by Sylvia Nasar, The New York Times, 14 March 1995: http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/03/14/business/a-hard-act-to-follow-here-goes.html?pagewanted=print4 briefing paper no. 4 / 19 july 2013
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products to meet new and unexpected needs. But does the market measure his
marginal social contribution well? While there is no denying Apple's innovations, one
cannot neglect the "star product" aspect. It is also hard to deny the role of conspicuous
consumption. Again, there might be network effects, and the market equilibrium does
not reflect the marginal contribution. Above all, the example of Apple, especially in its
war with Samsung, illustrates the role of patents in the monetization of innovation.
Being innovative is not enough to command astronomical income: one must be able to
protect one’s innovations. Creative entrepreneurs, like superstar performers of the
entertainment industry, need a legal environment that recognizes and protects their
image and intellectual property rights. In the absence of intellectual property rights,
the market fails: companies cannot benefit from their innovations, and there is a risk of
under-investment in research and development (especially if the innovations are expen-
sive). Patents attempt to provide the right incentives for innovation, but the corollary is
a reduction in competition. Intellectual property laws seek a compromise between
protection of intellectual property and competition. Earnings then depend heavily on
the details of this compromise (What is covered and what is not? For how long?),
which sets us relatively far away from the world of the perfectly competitive market. 
The examples chosen by Mankiw do not live in the economy with classical competi-
tive equilibrium that serves as his justification to defend their income. It even seems
that it is because they do not live in a world of perfect competition that they are part of
the 1%. Furthermore, in public policy terms, it is unrealistic to think that it is possible
to establish this classic competitive balance. Given their nature, the industries in which
top income earners are found (financial markets, entertainment, creative entrepre-
neurship, etc.) cannot be perfectly competitive by their very nature.
The market does not inform us very well about individual marginal contributions to
society. Above all, it tells us nothing about merit13: do Hollywood superstars deserve to
be paid 10 or 100 times more than the heroes (e.g. police or secret agents) they
portray? On the contrary, if workers have moral feelings, they will accept lower wages
if their work is perceived as having a positive social externality (see Preston, 1989)14.
However, if the market tells us nothing about merit, we still find it fair that people
benefit from the wages and salaries they earn. This is out of a sense not of distributive
justice but of procedural justice – earnings being the result of the exercise of a right or
freedom – the same way we find it fair that the winner of a lottery benefits from his or
her gains. It is the role of democracy to set the rules (including the top marginal tax
rates) so that the exercise of individual freedom is compatible with the common good.
13. Unlike Mankiw, Hayek and Nozick recognize that market incomes are not congruent to merit. Hayek
emphasizes the instrumental character of prices: “their function is not so much to reward people for what they
have done as to tell them in their own as well as in general interest what they ought to do. … it will often be
necessary that the return of people’s efforts do not correspond to recognizable merit ….” F. Hayek, 1976, Law,
Legislation and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice 
14. A. Preston, 1989, “The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 7, no. 4.briefing paper no. 4 / 19 july 2013 5
